It is shown that unitary quantum theory is not only consistent with but follows from decompositional equivalence: the principle that there is no preferred decomposition of the universe into systems, or alternatively, that there is no preferred quantum reference frame. Decompositional equivalence requires unitary quantum theory to be both observer-and scale-independent, requires time, "systems" and all classical information to be strictly observer-relative, and imposes an unavoidable free-energy cost on the acquisition of observational outcomes. This free energy cost of observation is characterized from first principles and shown to accord with known costs of information acquisition and storage by human observers.
Introduction
While both the mathematics of unitary quantum theory and its application to the prediction and analysis of experimental observations are extraordinarily well-developed, a simple, physical understanding of the theory has remained elusive for over 80 years. It is shown here that the familiar mathematical structure of unitary quantum theory follows from a single symmetry principle: that there is no preferred decomposition of the world into "parts" or "systems of interest." This principle of decompositional equivalence [1, 2] can alternatively be formulated as the principle that there is no objectively preferred quantum reference frame and hence no objectively "fungible" [3] classical information. The usual Hilbert space formalism of unitary quantum theory is obtained, without the need for ad hoc mathematical assumptions, by requiring the description of measurement interactions to comply with this symmetry. As the formalism obtained in this way has a firm physical basis, further post hoc interpretation is unnecessary.
Recognizing that unitary quantum theory is the result of decompositional equivalence reveals a scale-independent prediction of the theory: the identification of any system as a source of observational outcomes has a free-energy cost to the observer that increases combinatorially with the number of degrees of freedom the observer employs to identify the system. This cost can be viewed as the cost of drawing a system -environment boundary and hence as the cost to the observer of decoherence. This free-energy cost applies, in particular, to any system employed as a memory from which records of previous observations are obtained by read operations. Unitary quantum theory therefore characterizes "observers" as dissipative structures that extract free energy from and dump entropy into their environments, even when they are only retrieving information their own memories. Any approximation in which the free-energy cost of observation is treated as negligible constitutes a classical limit of the theory. Any post hoc interpretation that assumes such a classical limit -often in the form of an assumption that system identification by observers can be taken for granted -contradicts instead of explaining unitary quantum theory.
The next section defines decompositional equivalence and shows that it is satisfied by unitary quantum theory, but not satisfied by classical physics or by quantum theories that introduce irreversible "state collapse" or other system-or observer-dependent alterations of unitary dynamics. The remainder of the paper employs a sequence of thought experiments to derive unitary quantum theory by describing observation in a way that strictly complies with decompositional equivalence. It is first shown ( §3) that decompositional equivalence introduces an uncertainty regarding the physical provenance of observational outcomes that is representable as an entropy, referred to in [4] as the "factorization entropy" S F . It is then shown ( §4) that a sequence of observations carried out at constant S F can be represented either as a periodic interaction between an observer and an unknown collection of degrees of freedom or as a constant interaction between an observer and a periodic "effective system" that is naturally represented as a superposition of degrees of freedom. As the observer knows nothing about the "preparation" of such effective systems, standard assumptions needed to regard them as ensembles instead of superpositions cannot be made. The states of effective systems can, however, be represented using the usual density formalism ( §5), from which the standard Hilbert-space representation and the Born Rule follow. It is then shown that the overall state propagator U U that drives the observation and outcome-recording processes can be represented by a unitary exchange of labels on degrees of freedom ( §6) that conserves S F and is explicitly time symmetric. The thermodynamic cost to the observer of read access to the memory on which outcomes are recorded is then characterized, and shown to be consistent with the energy budget of human cerebral cortex. Paying this cost by dumping entropy into an otherwise unobserved environment constitutes decoherence and is consistent with unitarity. With these concepts in place, an analysis of the canonical double-slit experiment is used to reinterpret the quantum of action as a measure of the minimal time required to obtain one bit of information; the ∼ 100 f s minimal time at room temperature is consistent with minimal times for macromolecular processes. Alternative formulations of the classical limit of unitary quantum theory are then considered, and open questions are briefly discussed.
Decompositional equivalence is satisfied by unitary quantum theory
Consider a universe U characterized by a collection D(U) of physical degrees of freedom and a dynamics (anticipating the Hamiltonian) H U describing the interactions between these degrees of freedom. Here a "physical degree of freedom" is an aspect or feature of U that, when measured by some appropriate means, yields an outcome; no other metaphysical assumption is made. Define a physical model of U as a partition of D(U) into a finite collection of N + 2 non-overlapping components, with N ≥ 1 and a notational convention that names the components O, S 1 ... S N and E. Physical models so defined are complete in the sense that every degree of freedom of U is assigned to some one component of any physical model. Anticipating the usual language of decoherence, the component O can be considered to contain the physical degrees of freedom of an "observer," S 1 ... S N to contain the physical degrees of freedom of N "systems," and E to contain the physical degrees of freedom of an "environment," which by convention is taken to comprise whatever degrees of freedom are not assigned to either O or any of the S i . The universe U then satisfies decompositional equivalence if its dynamics H U is independent of its physical model. Informally, decompositional equivalence requires that H U be independent of any boundaries drawn to partition some degrees of freedom within D(U) away from others. In particular, it requires that H U be independent of any boundary defining the degrees of freedom of the observer O in any physical model. Assuming decompositional equivalence thus renders the postulated degrees of freedom and the dynamics acting on them observer-independent and hence "objective" by definition.
If we consider that a degree of freedom f ∈ D(U) occupies a physical state (anticipating the ket) |f and that the collection of all such states for all degrees of freedom of U compose a state space (anticipating Hilbert space) H U , decompositional equivalence requires that any product (anticipating the tensor product) ⊗ defined on H U be such that: 
where H res is the sum of all 3 rd and higher-order interactions between components of U. Equations (1) and (2) together require that the state propagator (anticipating unitarity) U U implementing the dynamics H U and the product ⊗ employed to factor the state space H U commute, i.e. the automorphism,
must be equally well be written,
for any two complete physical models
Exchanges of one complete physical model for another, therefore, must also commute with the state propagator U U as shown in Fig.1 . Fig. 1 : Decompositional equivalence as a commutativity requirement. The propagator U U commutes with exchanges of one physical model of the universe U for another.
The standard formalism of unitary quantum theory clearly satisfies the conditions stated by (1) and (2) ; the first of these conditions is often adopted as an axiom (e.g. in [5] ), while the second reflects the linearity of the Hamiltonian. Likewise, (4) enforces unitarity: it requires state propagation to be equivalent to a re-partitioning and hence re-labelling of degrees of freedom. The decompositional equivalence of unitary quantum theory is what allows physicists to choose any physical degree(s) of freedom for experimental investigation, as recently demonstrated with the observation of a quantum "Cheshire cat" [6] , without altering the fundamental dynamics H U ; it is thus an essential condition for open-ended and "objective" scientific investigation. Decompositional equivalence similarly allows the choice of any collection of degrees of freedom to serve as a quantum reference frame, i.e. as an experimental apparatus. As emphasized by Bartlett, Rudolph and Spekkens in a recent review, any measurement depends at least implicitly on a choice of quantum reference frame: "although fungible information can be encoded into any degree of freedom, and thus defined with respect to any reference frame, it is still the case that some degree of freedom must be chosen, and consequently some reference frame is required" ([3] p. 2, emphasis in original). Hence the commutativity requirement of Fig. 1 can also be expressed by the principle that no choice of quantum reference frame and hence no representation of fungible information can be preferred by H U .
Let us consider, however, the case of classical physics in the usual phase-space representation, here replacing "⊗" with the Cartesian product "×." Suppose H U is a classical 2-particle phase space spanned by position coordinates q 1 and q 2 and momentum coordinates p 1 and p 2 . From a purely formal perspective, nothing prevents decomposing this phase space as
The former two Cartesian-product decompositions are, however, not considered physical models within classical physics because they are not products of phase spaces and hence do not describe particles. Thus while classical physics permits any phase-space decompositions that do describe particles -and thus permits any partitioning of the classical world into "systems" comprising one or more particles -it nonetheless violates decompositional equivalence by imposing an a priori criterion of "physicality" in addition to the strictly decomposition-based definition of a "physical model" given above. The dynamics described by classical physics reflects this a priori criterion of physicality by respecting the boundaries in D(U) that partition the positions and momenta of dynamically-indestructible "fundamental" particles.
Interpretative additions to or modifications of unitary quantum theory that introduce decomposition-specific or decomposition-dependent alterations of the dynamics similarly violate decompositional equivalence. If the Copenhagen requirement that macroscopic apparatus be considered to be classical systems is strengthened to the claim that they are in fact classical systems -that is, that they have undergone a physically irreversible dynamical evolution that terminates in a classical state -decompositional equivalence is violated. The idea of von Neumann [7] that the act of observation physically collapses a quantum state, recently championed by Stapp [8] , for example, clearly violates decompositional equivalence. As pointed out in [3] , superselection rules such as the requirement that electric charge always has a determinate value correspond to unavailabilities of quantum reference frames. Assuming that such rules hold objectively, i.e. that the relevant quantum reference frames are unavailable in principle to all observers, violates decompositional equivalence.
Factorization entropy and its reduction
Let us now turn from a characterization of unitary quantum theory to its derivation. Consider an observer equipped only with a meter stick, who records a succession of measurement outcomes l 1 , l 2 , ...l n as finite bit strings (Fig. 2) . This observer has no capabilities beyond measuring lengths and recording outcomes, and may provisionally be thought of as a pure implementation of a von Neumann projection; the formal basis for this way of thinking will be established in §5 below. A natural question regarding the outcomes recorded by such an observer is that of their physical provenance: with what physical system was the observer interacting when each measurement was made and its outcome recorded? Ordinarily this question can be answered by providing a description of each measured system in terms of observable properties other than its length, or in the limit of minimal language, by pointing to a succession of systems recognizable by such properties and saying "that." For an observer equipped only with a meter stick, however, such answers are unavailable; an observer equipped only with a meter stick can only distinguish systems by their lengths, and can only "point" to a system by measuring its length. For such an observer, all systems of the same length are indistinguishable, regardless of the other degrees of freedom that such systems may have or the current values of such other degrees of freedom. The observer's uncertainty about the physical provenance of any given length outcome l i can, therefore, be represented by an entropy (in bits):
where Ω F (l i ) counts the number of distinct physical models [O, S, E] in which a measurement of the length of S yields the outcome l i . As physical models are definite, classical partitions of D(U) into a specific finite number (here three) of components, S F (l i ) is a classical entropy. Consistent with the terminology in [4] , call S F (l i ) the "factorization entropy" associated with the i th outcome value l i . The factorization entropy S F (l i ) clearly increases as the resolution with which l i is measured decreases; however, the resolution-independent total factorization entropy for length measurements S F (l) = i S F (l i ) depends only on the number of distinct physical models [O, S i , E i ] in which the S i component includes at least one length degree of freedom; S F is, therefore, in general a combinatoric function of the cardinality of D(U). Assuming a fixed measurement resolution, an observer can reduce the factorization entropy associated with an experimental outcome only by introducing an additional observable. Employing a meter stick to measure the position relative to some origin as opposed to the length of the system S, for example, requires designating as the origin some observable system S ref , which then serves as a reference frame in the sense of [3] . This S ref cannot, however, be identified as the origin for distance measurements by a measurement of its length; an observer equipped only with a meter stick cannot distinguish length measurements from distance measurements. A distinct measurement, for example of mass, must be introduced; one can suppose that the reference system 
where
counts the number of systems of mass m i located at a distance d i from a reference having a mass
; how much less depends on details of the dynamics H U . If the mass of S happens also to be 1 kg, moreover, S becomes indistinguishable from S ref and the "origin" becomes ambiguous.
The observer's ability to reduce factorization entropy by introducing a second observable as discussed above depends critically on her ability to perform the two required measurements simultaneously. Because S ref is being identified only by its mass, its mass must be under observation during the time that it is being employed as a reference. It must, for example, be physically present on a balance being employed to measure mass at the time that the measurement of its distance from S is being made. Because the mass measurement is also being employed to distinguish S from The introduction of additional observables and hence additional reference frames to reduce factorization entropy is clearly regressive: each additional reference frame introduced requires a further observable to distinguish it from other systems. The balances used to measure mass in Fig. 3 , for example, cannot be distinguished from other things only by length and mass measurements; the availability to O of some third observable with which to identify them must be assumed. This regress must end for any finite observer, either with the exhaustion of the observer's memory resources, or in the case of an observer containing over half the degrees of freedom of a finite universe, with the co-option of all remaining degrees of freedom in the universe as reference frames. The former case is clearly the one of interest; here O is faced with a minimum factorization entropy S min F (S), dependent only on memory resources, that characterizes any system S regardless of the observables employed. No such observer can, therefore, be assumed to have unambiguously identified any system S; such an observer can only be considered to be a component of a collection of physical models {[O, S i , E i ]} in which each system-environment combination S i -E i allocates at least the observed degrees of freedom to S i . The sections below consider the consequences of this in-principle ambiguity about system identification for O's representation of the system being interacted with ( §4), its states ( §5) and its dynamics ( §6-7).
Superposition from factorization entropy
The assumption that the observer O records a succession of outcome values l 1 , l 2 , ...l n that is made above places a significant constraint on the internal dynamics H O : in order for O to respond to each encounter with a position degree of freedom with the fixed action of recording a measurement outcome, H O must be at least quasi-periodic. Each such quasiperiodic action incrementally updates the state of some proper "memory" subset of the degrees of freedom of O by recording a new outcome. Hence O's memory, together with its updating procedure, can be regarded as both a (quasi-periodic) clock and as a counter; O's memory, in other words, serves as an internal reference frame for O-relative time. Since no other time parameter has yet been invoked, the clock implemented by O's memory updates can be taken to define time relative to O and hence can be assumed to be periodic by definition. It will be shown below that such observer-relative time is the only time that can be defined consistently with decompositional equivalence.
Consider now a physical model [O, L, E]
where O is the observer, L contains all length degrees of freedom of U that are not part of O, and the environment E as usual contains all other degrees of freedom. All that is known about the O -L interaction H OL is that it results in the recording of length outcome values and hence "ticks" of O's clock. Hence H OL can be treated as an instantaneous interaction with a fixed strength H Oℓ sufficient to cause an outcome to be recorded and the clock to tick. As the physical model [O, L, E] describes O as observing only length degrees of freedom, O's clock can be considered to tick only when a length is measured and the outcome is recorded. Call the period of this length-measurement clock ∆t ℓ . If ℓ k is a length degree of freedom in L, the interaction,
at the φ th k tick of O's clock results in O recording the outcome l k and carries a factorization entropy S F (l k ). Over the period spanned by the first n ticks of O's clock, the interaction,
results in O recording n outcomes, one at each clock tick, with the k th outcome l k carrying a factorization entropy S F (l k ). Hence the physical model [O, L, E] is equivalent, during the first n ticks of O's clock, to a sequence of n models [O, ℓ j , E j ], where E j is the environment containing all degrees of freedom outside of O except ℓ j .
The question of outcome provenance is the question of how the length degree of freedom ℓ k comes to interact with O at the O-relative time φ k ∆t ℓ . The idea that O somehow "selects" ℓ k on the basis of other degrees of freedom with which it is associated is unavailable; degrees of freedom other than length are invisible to O. All O does, and hence all H O does, is measure and record lengths. All that can be said, therefore, is that H Oℓ k is a component of the overall interaction H U , and that unknown other components of H U "select" ℓ k at φ k ∆t ℓ by bringing ℓ k into momentary contact with O at φ k ∆t ℓ , bearing in mind that φ k ∆t ℓ is defined only relative to O. These other components of H U can be considered to be or to depend on "hidden variables" -in the physical model [O, L, E], degrees of freedom of Ebut these "hidden variables" are inaccessible, in principle, to O and no assumptions about them can be made. From O's perspective, moreover, all components of H U , including H O and H Oℓ k are unknown; all that O records are outcomes of interactions with some length degrees of freedom or other. Hence from O's perspective, H OL can equally well be treated as a constant interaction H Oℓ eff with a periodic "effective" length degree of freedom,
of unknown provenance. The function b j (t ℓ ) in (9) determines the relative contribution of the j th degree of freedom in L to ℓ ef f at t ℓ , and will be determined in §5 below. From a physical perspective, (9) does not answer the question of the provenance of a length outcome l k measured at φ k ∆t ℓ by appeal to any "selection" of a specific ℓ k at φ k ∆t ℓ . It rather notes that as the constant interaction H Oℓ eff distinguishes length degrees of freedom only by an unmeasurable phase, each of the ℓ j must be considered to have contributed, as specified by b j (t), to the outcome l k . The factorization entropy remains S F (l k ), as Ω F (l k ) counts all degrees of freedom that could produce the outcome l k , and hence counts all ℓ j for which b j = 0.
Real observers interact not just with length degrees of freedom but with many others. If O records outcomes from independent measurements of many other degrees of freedom in addition to lengths, the period ∆t of O's memory-updating clock will be much shorter than ∆t ℓ ; in the limit of continuous interactions and continuous outcome recording ∆t → 0 and O's clock can be considered to measure a continuous O-relative time t. In this limit, the discrete counter φ j can be considered a continuous phase with respect to an arbitrary time unit, and the periodic interaction with ℓ ef f can be considered a constant interaction with a time-dependent superposition of length degrees of freedom,
This representation of systems by superpositions clearly generalizes. Consider, for example, the combined length and mass measurement illustrated in Fig. 3 . Here O records ordered pairs (m i , d i ) referred to a fixed m ref after interacting with an effective system S eff . The interaction can be written in the form of (8) simply by changing the coupling,
where H Omℓ couples O to one mass and one length degree of freedom and φ j is a phase relative to O's clock time t. As before, O can equally well describe this situation as one in which a (quasi-) periodic H U brings some pair (m k , ℓ k ) of degrees of freedom into contact with O at time φ k t or, alternatively, as one in which O interacts continuously with a (quasi-) periodic effective system,
where again b j (t) measures the extent to which the degrees of freedom contained within S j contribute to S eff .
The representation of effective systems by superpositions in (9), (10) and (12) is prima facie surprising; outcomes of uncertain provenance are standardly regarded as resulting from measurements of ensembles of systems, not from measurements of superpositions. It is worth pausing, therefore, to explicitly consider their physical meaning and to see why the standard ensemble representation does not convey this meaning. The superpositions in (9), (10) and (12) result from treating a periodic interaction with an unknown subset of an unknown collection of degrees of freedom as a constant interaction with an effective degree of freedom (in (9), (10)) or system (in (12)). The identity of the degree(s) of freedom from which an outcome α k is obtained at t remain uncertain by S F (α k ), an uncertainty that reflects the observer's objective ignorance of H U . Two features of this situation distinguish it from an interaction with an ensemble of photons or of air molecules, or with an ensemble of macroscopic objects such as indistinguishable tables or chairs. First, the observer knows about each of the S j only that an interaction with S j yields an outcome α j , for example a length-mass outcome as in Fig. 3 . Nothing is known about what other, unmeasured degrees of freedom may characterize S j , and nothing is known about the internal dynamics H S j ; in particular, nothing justifies the assumption that H S j ∼ H S k for any pair of components S j and S k . Hence no assumption that the S j are in any sense "copies" of some prototypical system with characterized degrees of freedom or dynamics can be made. Second and more subtly, both the universe U of which S j is a sample and the dynamics H U that brings S j into contact with O are also unknown. Hence there is no sense in which the S j can be considered to have been "selected" by O from any collection of systems characterized by known collective or bulk properties. These restrictions on O's knowledge can be summarized by saying that O knows nothing, and in the measurement scenario described can know nothing, about the "preparation" of S j . To employ a canonical example, for O the S j are not like photons sampled from a characterized incoherent beam, but like individual photons encountered at random in deep space. In a universe satisfying decompositional equivalence, defining an ensemble requires specifying a reference frame that distinguishes the ensemble from other collections of degrees of freedom, and hence requires specifying at least one collective observable. No such specification has been made in the case of the S j ; therefore the S j cannot be considered an ensemble. It is shown in the next section, however, that the usual density formulation can be recovered from (12) for the measurable states of the S j , and hence for the effective "state" of S eff . This is to be expected: the density can be constructed entirely post hoc on the basis of measured outcomes, in the absence of any a priori knowledge about state preparation.
States, densities and the Born rule
Thus far nothing has been said about the state occupied by any system S. It is natural to associate a state |S ik with an interaction between a system S i and an observer O that results in the recording of a finite tuple α k of outcomes for O's available observables. However, an observer who sequentially records outcomes α k and α l cannot, on the basis of these outcomes alone, distinguish a state change,
of S i from an exchange,
of S j for S i . Thus the requirement of decompositional equivalence given by (4) above matches the practical situation of any observer with finite observational means, a fact noted in the early days of cybernetics [10, 11] . From O's perspective, therefore, each system S k can be regarded as permanently occupying a single state |S k , the double subscripts can be dropped, and the recording of sequential outcomes α k and α l attributed to an exchange of measured systems,
This picture of "state change" as system exchange provides a natural implementation of Rovelli's view that time must be considered strictly relationally [12] . Nothing changes state in this picture except O, who continues to record outcomes. This recording of outcomes by O, however, is defined only in physical models that include O, and the overall dynamics H U is model-independent. The idea of an objective "universal" time in which H U acts thus evaporates; outside of a specified physical model, there is no clock with which to define it. The primary difference between the current picture and Rovelli's is that while Rovelli derives an observer-independent, system-relative "thermal" time by considering a classical ensemble of systems, the current picture includes no ensembles and time remains strictly observer -relative.
Regarding the system S k as permanently occupying the state |S k allows (12) to be written, from O's perspective, as:
where |S eff is the time-dependent effective "state" of the effective system S eff . As in the case of (9) above, (16) does not describe the "selection" of a particular |S k at the time φ k t, but rather attributes the outcome α k to all component states |S j , again weighted by b j . Equation (16) can be summarized with a slogan, "the state of a superposition is a superposition of states."
The state |S k was, however, defined above as the state of S, and therefore of S eff , that produces an outcome α k on contact with O. It is, therefore, natural to re-write |S k as |α k and hence to re-write (16) as,
A finite observer can record as finite bit strings at most some finite number d of outcomes; hence the states |α j corresponding to the d recorded tuples α j can be considered to collectively span a real space with finite dimension d, inner product α j |α k = δ jk and basis projections |α j α j |. With the coefficients e ıφ j t b j , this real space becomes a Hilbert space H S eff of dimension d with the same inner product and projections. The time-dependent vector |S eff (t) traces a path through this space.
Fuchs has argued that the Hilbert-space dimensions of physical systems must be finite on the basis of his view of the Hilbert-space dimension as a measure of the behavioral complexity or "autonomy" of a system [9] . In the current construction, finite Hilbert-space dimensions reflect the finite abilities of observers to measure behavioral complexity. This observer relativity of d is a direct consequence of decompositional equivalence: an finite observer cannot place an upper limit on the number of degrees of freedom S comprises, and so cannot place an upper limit on the complexity of H S . An observer O who makes measurements at low resolution can recognize only limited behavioral complexity; the Hilbert-space dimension O assigns to S does not objectively limit the behavior of S, and does not limit the behavioral complexity that can be observed by other observers equipped with higher resolution or different observables.
Given (17) , the usual density formalism and hence the Born rule follow straightforwardly. The probability P k (t) that O records α k at t depends only on the probability that one of the Ω F (α k ) systems for which O's observables yield the outcome α k is brought into contact with O by H U at t; hence,
where Ω F (α) counts all systems S i for which O records some outcome α i or other on contact.
In this case,
so as expected the normalization b 2 k = P k . The density,
then measures the probability that an interaction of S eff with O projects the k th basis vector out of H S eff , with the result that O records α k .
It is important to note that the probabilities P k defined by (18) are relative to a particular observer O and hence to physical models that contain O as a component. They are, therefore, "subjective" probabilities in the Bayesian sense (e.g. [9, 13] ). Third-party observers can construct physical models in which they make observations of the interactions between O and some collection of systems S i with respect to some environment, but such observers can at best agree about their own subjective probabilities regarding O's recording of outcomes. Because H U remains unknown, in principle, for all observers, they have no physical basis for regarding their subjective probabilities as objective.
This reconstruction of the Born rule reveals a physical consequence of decompositional equivalence: while physical systems characterized by finite numbers of observables -size, shape, location, distinctive labels or markings, etc. as well as mass, charge and angular momentum -are superpositions and hence only "effective" systems, not ensembles, their states are nonetheless mixtures. Each state |α k , in particular, represents Ω F (α k ) distinct possible sources of the outcome α k . An apparently pure state of such an effective system can be produced by any isolation procedure that selects an approximately pure component. The resources required to select such approximately pure components and hence "prepare" an apparently pure state are discussed below. That non-trivial resources should be required follows from the unitarity of the dynamics H U , to which we now turn.
Unitarity and decoherence
As discussed above, the state propagator that implements H U can be represented from the perspective of any observer O by a sequence, relative to O's time coordinate t, of exchanges of one system and hence one physical model for another. Such replacements of one physical model by another are, by definition, simply regroupings and relabelings of the degrees of freedom of U as shown in Fig. 1 ; they neither create nor destroy degrees of freedom. They are, therefore, in principle fully reversible in t. From O's perspective, they are also thermodynamically reversible in t, as they do not change S F (S eff ) for O. Hence from the perspective of any observer, this state propagator U U is unitary in their own observer-relative time.
It may be objected here that U U cannot be unitary from O's perspective, since the action of U U causes O to record outcome values and hence increases O's information about S eff . This objection, which lies at the heart of the traditional quantum measurement problem, relies on an often-implicit assumption: that O has free read access to her memory. It is read access to memory, not write access, that gives O ever-increasing information about S eff . Hence Zurek, for example, considers the ability of observers to "readily consult the content of their memory" as distinguishing them from apparatus ( [14] p. 759). The observer's memory, however, is a reference frame, the one that defines time for O. Any assumption that O has some preferred access to this reference frame that does not involve an ordinary physical interaction and hence does not generate a factorization entropy violates decompositional equivalence. To comply with decompositional equivalence, O's read accesses to memory must be regarded as observations like any others. A memory read access is, in this case, an observation of an effective system M O eff with an associated factorization entropy S F (M O eff ). Repeated observations of M O eff have no effect on S F (M O eff ), so the unitarity of U U is preserved.
The requirement that observers must observe their memories to obtain information about previous observational outcomes ties unitary quantum theory to classical thermodynamics and explains why observers must invoke decoherence to regard their memories as classical. To see this, it is useful to return momentarily to the balances and meter sticks considered in §3 above. In order to employ the meter stick to make length measurements, the observer must keep it in hand as shown in Fig. 2 ; letting go of the meter stick renders it no longer identifiable as a meter stick, and hence no longer useful as a reference frame. As noted in the discussion of Fig. 3 , the systems S and S ref must remain on the balances while the distance between them is being measured; otherwise the identity of the distance origin S ref is lost. The observer must, in other words, continuously monitor the degrees of freedom of her reference frames in order to use them. This requirement for continuous "Zeno effect" monitoring of reference frames is obvious in any context involving real measurements using real apparatus. Changes in the condition or behavior of an apparatus that have nothing to do with its "pointer states" -the failure of a vacuum pump, for example, or a power supply catching fire -have immediate and significant consequences for the information content of recorded measurement outcomes.
Let us consider this monitoring process first from the perspective of classical thermodynamics. In this case each reference frame -each apparatus -R i can be considered to occupy a classical state |R i c about which the observer has an uncertainty expressible in terms of a classical entropy S(R i ). By monitoring |R i c , O can reduce S(R i ) by one bit per degree of freedom monitored per unit time. This entropy decrease has a classical energy cost of 0.7 kT per bit, which must be supplied from free energy accessible to O; hence monitoring |R i c over a period ∆t involves a classical action of 0.7 kT ∆t per bit. This requirement for a classical action is familiar: reference frames cannot be monitored by observers who have died or devices that are not plugged in. The free energy expended by O to monitor |R i c clearly cannot come from R i itself, nor can it come from any other system being monitored. It must, therefore, come from the surrounding environment, which by serving as a free energy source serves as an entropy sink. This classical situation is illustrated in Fig. 4 . One consequence of the requirement that an observer monitoring the state of a classical reference frame must dump excess entropy into the environment is that the observer's interactions with the environment cannot be considered "observation" of the environment's state: the environment is a source of energy for O but cannot be a source of state information. Hence two fundamental assumptions of decoherence, that the environment serves as a heat bath and that the observer does not observe it, follow from a classical characterization of state monitoring. The essential role of the unobserved environment as a free energy supply shows why the "uninteresting" case of an "observer" with over half the degrees of freedom of the universe mentioned in §3 above is uninteresting; such an observer cannot monitor all of the remaining degrees of freedom, since without an unobserved environment, no environmental free energy is available to do so. can be considered to be |α k with probability P k = 1 as ∆t → ∞. In this limit, the classical entropy S(R eff i ) → 0 for O; as the energetic cost of reaching this limit is:
Entropy ∆S(R
it can only be approximated by a finite observer. The factorization entropy, however, remains:
a number that is bounded, in principle, only by log 2 N! where N is the number of degrees of freedom in the universe. As noted in §3, S F (R eff i ) can be further reduced only by monitoring additional reference frames.
This reasoning can now be applied to the question of the observer's memory. As O writes outcomes into her memory, she recruits progressively more degrees of freedom to represent bit strings. For simplicity, each new m-bit memory record can be considered to be a reference frame R eff i into which some m-bit outcome α i is written. If O monitors n of these reference frames to assume that they remain in their respective states |α 1 ...|α n , her freeenergy cost is E mon = 0.7 (n · m) kT , which as in Fig. 4 must be paid by the environment. She must also, however, pay from environmental free energy a factorization cost of:
to select or allocate the k th memory record. Once again, this is obvious in practice: finding a location in memory to put something takes energy. Using a recent estimate of 16·10 9 neurons in the cerebral cortex with 10 3 synapses per neuron, for example, the room-temperature factorization cost of allocating one synapse selected at random to serve as a memory record is:
This is remarkably close to the daily energy usage per cortical synapse, again assuming 16 · 10 9 cortical neurons with 10 3 synapses per neuron, of 6.2 · 10 −8 J obtained by measuring total daily cortical glucose metabolism [15] . Brains build memories by selectively activating networks of synapses between cells. Assuming a linear network, the marginal cost of allocating an additional synapse is only:
Hence allocating a small network is as expensive as allocating a large one, and large networks have proportionally more energy resources to devote to content monitoring than do small ones. Humans observers can, therefore, be expected to record individual memories as relatively small variations with respect to massively multivariate reference frames; individual outcomes of pointer-state measurements, for example, can be expected to be recorded in the context of memories of what an instrument or a whole laboratory looks like. This aspect of episodic memory follows from a consideration of factorization entropy alone, independently of evolutionary or other explicitly biological considerations.
Recognizing these energetic costs of observation enables a simple, physical picture of decoherence. From O's perspective, the "pointer states" of a system S are whatever states O is able to measure and hence obtain outcomes from using her available reference frames. There is no "choice of basis" problem for O. If O has a meter stick and a balance, length and mass are available as bases; otherwise they are not. If O has no resources with which to obtain outcomes from the degrees of freedom composing S, S is invisible to O. The relationships between O and her reference frames on the one hand and the environment on the other are strictly defined: O monitors the former and obtains free energy from the latter. The environment enables O's observations by providing the free energy O needs to monitor her reference frames, including her own memory of previous outcomes. The environment does not, however, select the pointer states of S independently of O or encode any information about S that is available to O; the environment is strictly an energy source and an entropy sink. If O obtains information about S from the ambient photon field, for example, it is because she monitors the state of that field. It is, therefore, a reference frame for O, not part of the environment. In this picture, decoherence is not a physical process implemented by H U , but rather a specification of the roles played by O, S, E and the reference frames R i in any physical model [O, S, E, R i ]; it is, in other words, a logical consequence of treating O as an energy-using, entropy-producing outcome recorder relative to which "time" is defined. Decoherence appears to be a physical process because we habitually neglect the cost of observation, treat system-environment boundaries as somehow objectively given, and therefore search for an explanation of these "given" boundaries in the structure of H U . There is no such explanation: H U is boundary-independent, as the very phrase "entangled with the environment" indicates.
One immediate consequence of this view of decoherence is that two observers O and
for any i, j cannot "see" each other's systems and hence cannot share outcomes. They are "mutually decoherent" and, in the Everettian picture (e.g. [16] ), inhabit different "branches" of |U . Even if S = S ′ , two observers who share no reference frame R i and hence no observable cannot share outcomes, confirming Rovelli's "main observation" that in unitary quantum theory "different observers may give different accounts of the same sequence of events" driven by H S ( [17] p. 1644). The energy and entropy flows depicted in Fig. 4 and computed in (21) and (23), and the recording of outcomes that they enable, are moreover strictly model-dependent. In any physical model that does not contain O as a component, these flows are no longer defined, and any claim that the degrees of freedom composing the unspecified component O in any sense "encode" classical information about any other degrees of freedom is meaningless. This non-objectivity of classical correlations, which has been noted previously by Zanardi [18, 19] among others, has the immediate consequence that no information is objectively classical, in the precise sense of being fully "fungible" [3] and hence fully reference-frame independent. As evidenced by the struggles of SETI teams to develop or predict codes for communication with extraterrestrial civilizations, even the most "obvious" digital codes require assumptions about shared knowledge and hence measurement capabilities to convey information. To an observer without such shared knowledge or capabilities, the most elaborate encyclopedia is unreadable and possibly even invisible. The idea that observers who share no reference frame in common -who only partially share a traced-over environmental sink for excess entropy -can achieve consensus about any observation and hence classical correlation between their respective memories violates decompositional equivalence and is untenable in the context of unitary quantum theory [20] .
Let us now return, finally, to the question of unitarity, and suppose that O dumps entropy primarily into some component F O of the environment while continuously monitoring
, where E is the remainder of the environment, net information flows from F O to O and O's clock runs forward. Decompositional equivalence allows, however, this model to be relabeled so that F O is treated as the observer and O as the entropy sink. With this relabeling, the same net information flows from O to F O and F O 's clock runs forward. The forward direction for F O 's clock is, however, the reverse direction for O's clock, confirming the symmetry of the overall propagator U U with respect to any observer-relative time explicitly. This label-reversal shows, moreover, that the information received by O cannot be viewed as confined to O's memory any more than the dumped entropy can be viewed as confined to F O . Any such confinement assumes a physically-meaningful boundary in U and hence violates decompositional equivalence. The continuous escape of information from O's memory provides additional, practical urgency to the requirement that O continuously monitor its state, spending free energy in the process, to assure the continued read availability of its previously-recorded contents.
Interference and the classical limit
We are now in a position to understand why the canonical double-slit experiment gives the results that it does. The double-slit apparatus can be considered a reference frame R comprising four components: a detector screen R 1 , a screen with two slits R 2 , a photon source R 3 and a rigid housing R 4 that includes the vacuum chamber, power supplies, etc. The measured system S(t) is the time-dependent position on R 1 of each photon as it arrives. The observer O records these positions in a memory M O . "Effective" labels are dropped for convenience but are to be understood. The situation is illustrated in Fig. 5 . From the classical perspective employed to construct the apparatus, each component of R plays a particular role in determining the measured state of the system S. The source R 3 "prepares" S by generating a classical "stream" -in the low-intensity limit a classical "sequence" -of photons. The observer directly monitors only one degree of freedom of R 3 : its intensity. The double-slit screen R 2 further "prepares" S by partially blocking the classical "trajectory" of the photons. It has two binary degrees of freedom monitored by the observer; either of the two slits "L" or "R" can independently be either open or closed. The target screen R 1 provides the spatial (x,y) coordinate system in which S is measured. The observer monitors the position with respect to the environment of this coordinate system. The rigid housing R 4 defines the relative positions of R 1 , R 2 and R 3 along an axial z coordinate and isolates the photon stream from the overall environment. The observer monitors the environmental position and the structural integrity (vacuum pressure, light-tightness, etc.) of R 4 . An "experiment" is a specified set of values for the monitored degrees of freedom. Assuming all other values are held constant by the observer, an experiment can in practice be specified by specifying just the slit positions, i.e. (L, R) = (1,1), (1,0), (0,1) or (0,0).
Let us now enforce decompositional equivalence. The situation in Fig. 5 becomes a physical model [O, S, R, E]. The representation of the apparatus R and hence of the preparation of S is limited to the degrees of freedom actually monitored, i.e. the source intensity I and the settings of the L and R slits. Configurations of R that yield the same preparation are indistinguishable; in particular, the observer cannot distinguish an initial preparation by R 3 followed by a re-preparation by R 2 from a 1-step preparation by a single composite source (R 2 + R 3 ). Preparation by the left (L) and right (R) slits can be represented by projections onto their respective positions when open and multiplication by zero when closed, so in terms of the x coordinate defined at R 1 ,
The positions of the composite source (R 2 + R 3 ) at each slit setting are then:
The (1,1) setting of the slits corresponds, therefore, to preparation of the system by a superposition of sources. Each photon produced with the (1,1) slit setting has two origins, and hence two components |L and |R separated by a phase dependent on the L − R slit separation. When viewed in this way, the idea that any experiment obtains "which path" information evaporates. The only question that can be asked is "which source," a question that can only be answered by monitoring R. Unless R is monitored, all sources must be considered to be contributing, a situation indistinguishable from slit setting (1,1).
The complete absence of "which path" information in the double-slit experiment illustrates a general point: if decompositional equivalence is respected, time derivatives are not observables. Every "measurement" of momentum, for example, is in actuality a measurement of position with mass or energy employed as a reference to limit S F and hence constrain the identity of the measured system. Decompositional equivalence assures, however, that S F is never zero: an observer can never know that the same system has been observed in two distinct locations, and hence cannot experimentally implement the time derivative. As in (4), Fig. 1, or (15) , the overall dynamics can always be represented by exchanges. Time derivatives are, therefore, well defined only for sequences of measurement outcomes, and hence characterize "effective" systems defined by such outcome sequences only post hoc.
If momentum is not observable in a theory satisfying decompositional equivalence, the uncertainty relation σ x σ p ≥ /2 must have a different significance from that usually attributed to it. If the "measurement" of p is in fact a second, later measurement of x, no "Heisenberg microscope" argument applies; the commutator [x,x] = 0. What is uncertain in this situation is the identity of what is being measured; the finite minimum value /2 is indicating that S F cannot be zero. The minimum value of S F , however, is 1 bit. It is natural, therefore, to suppose that the minimal action /2 by U U adds 1 bit of factorization entropy to a system, and to consider both σ x σ p ≥ /2 and σ E σ t ≥ /2 -a statement that similarly involves a non-observable, t -as indicating that minimal addition of entropy.
If an entropy reduction of 1 bit costs 0.7 kT in energy, it costs at minimum /(1.4 kT ) ∼ 100 f s in time at room temperature. This is on the order of the minimal time for photoreactions in macromolecules [21] , and is therefore a reasonable estimate of the minimal time for a system with sufficient structural complexity to qualify as an observer "like us" to record a 1-bit outcome. At T P , of course, the minimal time to encode 1 bit is 1.4 t P ; what might count as an "observer" in this situation is unclear.
With this understanding of , it becomes clear that what is quantized in unitary quantum theory is entropy. The classical limit of unitary quantum theory can then be stated by any of the following:
• system identification is free (S F → 0);
• information is free ( → 0);
• decoherence is free;
• read access to memory is free;
• time derivatives are observable;
• classical phase space is well-defined;
• outcome recording is instantaneous;
• observers have infinite memory.
All of these statements reflect the fundamental classical assumption that observers can identify physical systems and track them through time. All violate decompositional equivalence, and any "interpretation" of unitary quantum theory that assumes any of them contradicts the theory instead of explaining it. Zurek, for example, states as "axiom(o)" of unitary quantum theory, that "the Universe consists of systems" ( [14] p. 746) and regards system-environment boundaries as given when discussing the "witnessing" by the environment that makes information about systems "available" to observers. If one reads "consists of" in this "axiom(o)" ontically, as indicating that some collections of degrees of freedom form environmentally witnessable "systems" while others do not, it violates decompositional equivalence and hence contradicts unitary quantum theory. It describes how the world appears to observers who neglect the energetic costs of observation, but blocks any understanding of why observation should have such costs.
Summary and discussion
What has been shown here is that the basic tools, concepts and phenomena of unitary quantum theory follow from a rigorous insistence on decompositional equivalence when describing the process of observation. We can, therefore, expect observers who employ radically different reference frames from our own to agree with us about unitary quantum theory provided that they accept decompositional equivalence; conversely, we can expect observers who believe their own reference frames to be physically preferred to either reject or have difficulty understanding unitary quantum theory. We cannot, however, expect observers who employ radically different reference frames from ours to agree with us about observational outcomes or about model-based inferences such as the direction of time or the age or mass distribution of the universe. Indeed, our own ability to agree about such things can only be attributed to an overlap of reference frames, and hence of physical models, sufficient to allow us to mutually interpret sequences of physical interactions with each other as "local classical communication." How our physical structures make this possible remains an open question; the reasoning above indicates that our ability to dump entropy into systems that we are mutually not observing plays a critical enabling role.
The present considerations provide a straightforward answer to Zurek's concern that "a compelling explanation of what the systems are -how to define them given, say, the overall Hamiltonian in some suitably large Hilbert space -would undoubtedly be most useful" ( [22] p. 1818): there is no such explanation. "Systems" can only be understood as components of physical models, and physical models are semantic constructs, not physical objects. The environment, therefore, cannot "witness" systems for observers. All it can do -and what it must do -is provide the free energy necessary for observers to construct their semantics. What physical properties an observer must have in order to use environmental free energy to construct decompositions and hence "systems" to be observed is not yet known.
The enormous empirical success of unitary quantum theory can be considered evidence that our universe satisfies decompositional equivalence. Such a global symmetry can be expected to have consequences at large scales as well as small ones. By forcing "time" to be construed in entirely observer-relative terms, for example, decompositional equivalence suggests that the relationship between "post-inflationary" and "inhabited by observers" is one of conceptual equivalence instead of enabling cause and possible consequence as in, e.g. [23] . The consequences of this way of thinking for questions such as the cosmological measure problem remain to be explored.
